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Abstract
I argue here that Frege’s eventual view on the relation between sentences and the 
thoughts they express is that, ideally, a sentence expresses exactly one thought, and a 
thought is expressed by exactly one (canonical) sentence.  This may clash with some 
mainstream views of Frege, for it has the consequence of de-emphasizing the 
philosophical significance of the question of how it is possible for someone to regard 
one sentence as true yet regard another sentence that expresses the same thought as 
false.  This account of Frege was developed by taking a long-range look at his writings 
over the course of his life. 
1.  Introduction and Overview 
Let us agree on this much:  people use sentences to communicate.  On the view that 
sometimes it is thoughts that are communicated, then, sentences can be used to 
communicate thoughts.  This was Frege’s view.  However, sentences are used not 
only to communicate thoughts, but to do other things as well.  And, sometimes, in 
conversation and in writing in natural language,  people rely on more than the 
sentence itself to communicate a thought.  This, too, was Frege’s view.  The study of 
language is not the study of logic.
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     Still, developing a logic can start with the study of language, and progress 
by clarifying how logic is different from language.  Unlike the study of language, logic 
studies sentences only inasmuch as they are used to communicate thoughts, and logic 
is about using nothing more than sentences to do so. This approach is sometimes part 
of an anti-psychologistic program in logic, for  these two differences between language 
and logic involve separating the communication of thoughts from psychological 
aspects of communication.  
     It can be a bit  misleading to call this approach anti-psychologistic without 
qualification, though, for it is not against the use of psychology in places other than 
logic: in fact, it draws attention to the fact that  psychology is involved in many cases of 
human communication.  An anti-psychologistic view of logic based upon a conviction 
that psychology has no place in logic was not the only motivation  a mathematician 
might have for distinguishing logic from natural language.  For, by Frege’s time, it was 
becoming clear to many mathematicians that natural language, no matter how well-
suited it might be for conversation, prose and poetry, was not always up to the task of 
providing a language in which to  prove theorems and show how the truth of one 
thought depends upon the truth of another.  Relying on natural language, different 
mathematicians produced proofs whose conclusions were in conflict.   What was 
needed was a means of referring to thoughts that allowed one to determine how 
thoughts were related to each other.  
     The anti-psychologistic aspect of Frege’s approach is the conviction that relations 
between thoughts are not a matter of human psychology of any sort whatsoever, 
general or individual, and hence that any formal calculus of sentences meant to reflect 
the relationship between thoughts between should not involve psychology.  In Frege’s 
writings, there was never any wavering, never the slightest hint of compromise, on this 
point.  
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     Another, less crucial goal, was that the means of expressing a thought using a 
sentence in this formal calculus be at same time a means of communicating thoughts 
that did not depend upon the contingencies of an individual human’s psychology.  This 
latter goal was something aimed at, but even Frege came to realize that there was no 
guarantee that it could be achieved in every case using the system of logical notation 
he had developed.  
     Sentences are used to enable people to grasp thoughts, but there can be cases 
where a sentence enables some people, but not others, to grasp the thought it 
expresses.  Ultimately, communication of thoughts relies on some common 
understanding, including  ‘a store of concepts’ held in common;  Frege wrote that a 
common store of concepts is handed down from one generation to the next  (Frege 
1980, p. 59) , and that learning a language necessarily involves nonverbal 
communication.  Once the common understanding of relevant concepts is achieved, 
though, it becomes possible for communication of thoughts to proceed such that the 
sentence alone communicates the thought, without any reference to particulars such 
as the context in which it was uttered or particulars of the  psychological state of the 
speaker or hearer.  When, however, this common understanding is lacking, as Frege 
fretted might be the case with certain concepts such as the mathematical/logical notion 
of a ‘course of values’ of a function used in his formulation of Basic Law V, Frege did 
not count on everyone grasping the thought expressed by the sentence.  Hence 
different people might disagree on the truth of a sentence, yet their disagreement not 
be a matter of one person holding a grasped thought true and the other person 
holding the same thought false.  The disagreement arises because they are not 
grasping the same thought.  
     That different people hearing or reading a sentence might not grasp the same 
thought by it was an unhappy situation that, as time went on, Frege learned to accept 
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as inescapable in practice --- in the general case.   For the more specific and very 
urgent issue of giving a foundation for arithmetic, however, he at least began the 
project with the hope that the necessary common understanding might be achieved 
among mathematicians, if only the right formalism for expressing the thoughts used in 
arithmetic might be developed.  That was the goal of the Begriffsschrift (Concept 
Script):  to develop a formalism for statements that expressed the thoughts needed to 
prove theorems of arithmetic.  It was not until he got down to working out the project in 
detail in the Grundgesetze (Basic Laws of Arithmetic) that he hit the little snags he 
regarded as temporary imperfections that might eventually be perfected.2  
     The formalism Frege developed in the Begriffsschrift is generally regarded as 
containing the fundamental features of modern symbolic logic --- and so as an 
historically significant breakthrough from previous logics, including subject-predicate 
logic and Boolean logic.  Thus reverential appellations such as ‘the father of modern 
logic’ are heaped upon Frege.  In light of such an accomplishment, many have 
wondered at Frege’s seeming antipathy to formalism in arithmetic, and to his criticisms 
of Hilbert’s formalization of geometry, especially his criticisms of implicit definitions of 
concepts such as the concept of point.  Some sympathetic examinations of Frege’s 
views have already been offered (Resnik 1974, Sterrett 1994, Blanchette 1996, 
Antonelli and May 2000, Tappenden 2001).  One point on which Frege did strenuously 
diverge from Hilbert was on the use of (what we would now call) uninterpreted 
statements as premises in proofs.  
2
  Here I am referring to Frege’s remark in the Grundgesetze  ‘A dispute can arise, so far as I can see, only 
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extensions of concepts.’  (Frege 1964, p. 3 -4)    Here he does express confidence that the concept of 
course of values might be enunciated more clearly, and that, when it is, disputes about Basic Law V will be 
settled.  His attitude towards the very different kind of problem later pointed out by Betrand Russell was 
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snags’.   Frege addressed Russell’s paradox in Appendix II to volume II of the Grundgesetze .
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     The thesis I will put forth in this paper  --- that, ultimately, Frege came to the view 
that  'ideally, one sentence, one thought; one thought, one sentence' ---  bears on 
questions about how to explain and understand Frege’s criticisms of formalism in 
arithmetic and Hilbert’s use of uninterpreted statements and implicit definition.  These 
criticisms Frege made of his contemporaries are not ad hoc reactions or piece meal 
bits of philosophy, but reflect a more unified view about the relation between 
sentences and thoughts that was slowly being clarified as he tried to attain his original 
goals of putting mathematics on a solid foundation.  The view about the relation 
between sentences and thoughts that developed over time was as much a result of 
frustrations encountered as of initial convictions vindicated, and one that he came to 
accept as practically necessary over time, rather than one chosen as a starting point.  
2.  Language and Logic
According to Frege, it is the thought that matters -- at least to the logician.  Sentences 
express thoughts, he said (Frege 1918, 328).  But he also found it frustrating to have to 
use sentences to communicate thoughts.  He lamented that he could not put a thought 
in the hands of his readers as a mineralogist might put a rock-crystal in the hands of 
audience members.   'One fights against language,'he wrote in a footnote to his essay 
'Thought”,  'and I am compelled to occupy myself with language although it is not my 
proper concern here.' (Frege 1918, 329-330)   According to him, the logician is 
concerned only with the thought expressed by the sentence.  The thought, however,  
cannot be handled on its own, it can only be dealt with as wrapped in a linguistic form.  
     If sentences express thoughts, then what is the problem?  Twofold:  sometimes --- 
often, in fact --- (i)  the content of a sentence goes beyond the thought it expresses.   
Sometimes  'the opposite' happens,  instead : (ii)  the thought expressed goes beyond 
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the content of a sentence; the 'mere wording. . . does not suffice for the expression of 
the thought”.  (Frege 1918; 331)  
     The examples Frege gave of sentences in natural language in which the content of 
the sentence goes beyond the thought expressed by it  ( i.e., of case (i) above) 
consisted of pairs of sentences that expressed the same thought, although one 
sentence in the pair was a transformed version of the other.  Although the sentences 
expressed the same thought, one of the sentences had a content that the other did not.  
An example is the pair:  'Alfred has not come.'  and 'Alfred has not yet come.' -- the 
latter sentence differs from the former by the addition of the word 'yet'  and it creates 
expectations in the hearer that the first does not.  Some other examples of 
transforming one sentence into another that expresses the same thought but has a 
different content are:  (a)  replacing  ‘but’  for  ‘and’ in a sentence,  (b)  adding ‘still’ or 
‘already’ to emphasize part of a sentence, and  (c) changing the verb from active to 
passive and the accusative into the subject.  
     In all  these examples of case (i), the difference between the original and 
transformed sentences may not be trivial from the standpoint of what the hearer comes 
to understand or expect upon hearing it,  so the sentences may well be said to differ.  
But, according to Frege’s own remarks on such examples, the original and 
transformed sentence do express the same thought.  This is because these  
transformations 'do not touch the thought, they do not touch what is true or 
false.'(Frege 1918; 331)  Logical relationships are  relationships between thoughts;  
the relationships between thoughts in which Frege was interested were relationships 
of one thought’s dependence on another for justification.  So, in the context of an 
endeavor in which we are concerned only with relationships between thoughts, rather 
than with expectations created in the hearer, we are not concerned with variations on 
a given sentence that do not affect its truth value.  This point is made by saying that  
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the logician is not concerned with the difference between two such sentences.   
      ‘Alfred has still not come.’, says Frege,  is not false even if Alfred’s arrival is not 
expected.  'Alfred has still not come.' is a different sentence than 'Alfred has not 
come.”,  but the two sentences express the same thought. (Frege 1918; 331)  That is 
because a thought , for Frege,  'is something for which the question of truth can arise at 
all.' (Beany 1997, p. 328)  That different sentences of our natural language can 
express the same thought is no problem for the logician:  the logician just doesn’t 
distinguish between them.  In the Begriffsschrift, Frege had explained the purpose of 
his logical symbolism by comparing it to a specialized mechanical aid for seeing: a 
microscope.  The comparison was meant to emphasize that logical symbolism is 
designed for a special purpose, as is a microscope.  Logic is as poor a tool for 
capturing all the distinctions important to understanding conversation and poetry as is 
a microscope for viewing a landscape.  The point here is that one must be modest 
about the aims of a particular logical symbolism.  Or, rather, one must be clear about 
its purpose.  For purposes of capturing what is relevant to the kind of content of a 
sentence of interest in doing logic, sentences that express the same thought should 
not be distinguished.3  Let’s call this activity ---  the activity of, for the purposes of logic,  
identifying sentences that express the same thought  --- pruning sentences. 
     What about the opposite situation, i.e., case (ii), when the thought expressed goes 
beyond the content of a sentence?  To Frege, the task is clear:  since logic is 
concerned only with thoughts, we need to augment  such a sentence,  so that the 
thought determined by the sentence is unique.  The kind of sentence that logic is 
3
 In a 1906 letter to Husserl, Frege wrote that, while it is not possible to say exactly when two propositions 
are merely equipollent and when they are congruent, this is not an obstacle in principle :   'All that would be 
needed would be a single standard proposition for each system of equipollent propositions, and any 
thought could be communicated by such a standard proposition.  For given a standard proposition 
everyone would have the whole system of equipollent propositions, and he could make the transition to 
any one of them whose illumination was particularly to his taste.'(p. 303 in Beany (1997))
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concerned with is the kind that expresses a thought.   Case (i) was the case in which 
different sentences may express the same thought --- this the logician tolerates by not 
distinguishing between the various sentences, and perhaps selecting one as 
canonical and not using the others  ---  but case (ii) is not so easily accommodated, for 
it is intolerable that the same sentence should express different thoughts.   
     Hence, when a sentence contains indexicals (e.g., 'I”, 'this”, 'that”, 'yesterday”) or 
proper names (e.g., Dr. Lauben, Venus) the logician is in trouble if stuck with only the 
sentence to go on.  Thus, Frege says that  'The words ‘This tree is covered with green 
leaves’  are not sufficient by themselves to constitute the expression of a thought, for 
the time of utterance is involved as well.' He continues: 'Only a sentence with the time-
specification filled out, a sentence complete in every respect, expresses a thought.' 
(Frege 1918; 343)  Let’s call this activity extending a sentence, on analogy with a 
gardener’s activity in doing the opposite of pruning a small offshoot -- here, each of a 
set of multiple offshoots is encouraged to grow and extend itself to become a 
distinguishable branch in its own right.  
     What, then, he asks,  should a logician make of a sentence such as 'Dr Lauben was 
wounded”?  This sentence expresses different thoughts to different people, depending 
upon the meaning each associates with 'Dr Lauben”, which in turn may depend upon 
whether they are acquainted with him and what they know about him.  Frege gives a 
long example in which various people associate different definite descriptions with the 
proper name 'Dr. Lauben”, and are in different states of ignorance or knowledge about 
whether people with whom they are acquainted fit those descriptions.  A fellow named 
Leo and a fellow named Rudolph both hear Dr. Lauben say aloud 'I was wounded.'  
Later, Rudolph hears Leo report aloud: 'Dr. Lauben was wounded.' Whether or not the 
statement made by Dr. Lauben and the statement made by Leo express the same 
thought to Rudolph is going to depend upon whether or not Rudolph knew that the 
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man he heard saying 'I was wounded' was Dr. Lauben.  The point of these examples 
is that  'Dr. Lauben' is a proper name, but there may be different modes of determining 
the man to whom it refers ('the way that the object so designated is presented”).  The 
logician does need to take these differences into account, Frege says, for different 
modes of determination for 'Dr Lauben' will result in different thoughts being 
expressed by the sentence 'Dr. Lauben was wounded'. (Frege 1918: 333)   
     Here, the problem is not a matter of difference in truth value of the different thoughts, 
for, says Frege, either the thoughts expressed by the sentence are all true or the 
thoughts expressed by it are all false.  The problem is that knowledge of the truth of 
these thoughts can differ due to different hearers’ mode of determination of the person 
to whom a proper name refers, and this indicates that the thoughts are different.  In 
'Thought”, Frege addresses this kind of case --- i.e.,  the kind of case wherein the same 
sentence can be used to express different thoughts --- by adding a restriction on 
sentences that will be permitted in a logical treatment of any topic involving proper 
names.  The restriction is this:  restrict the meaning  (sense) of proper names so that no 
sentence expresses more than one thought.    Let’s call this kind of activity extending a 
sentence, too, for, as in the other examples of case (ii), it is analogous to dealing with 
multiple offshoots by encouraging each offshoot to take its own shape, and so 
distinguishing each offshoot from each other.  However, we do not ever use more than 
one proper name for an individual -- we may have multiple modes of determination 
that happen to determine the same object, but no proper name has as its meaning 
more than one mode of determination.  In Frege’s words:   'So we must really stipulate 
that for every proper name there shall be just one associated manner of presentation 
of the object so designated.  It is often unimportant that this stipulation should be 
fulfilled, but not always.'(Frege 1918; 333)   
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3. Natural Language and the Formal Garden of Propositions
Thus, Frege requires that the sentences of one’s natural language that are the concern 
of logic be in some cases extended (distinguished from each other) and in some cases 
pruned (identified with each other), so that the relationships that hold between the 
resulting sentences -- sentences the logician can , so to speak, hold in his hand and 
show to his audience --- express the relationships that hold between the thoughts they 
express.   As described in the previous section, sentences that express the same 
thought are not distinguished from each other (metaphorically, the several branches 
are pruned down to a single branch).  Sentences that do not determine exactly one 
thought are extended (so that they determine only one thought) or disambiguated such 
that several sentences,  each of which  determines exactly one thought,  are obtained.    
The result is that, for the pile of sentences with which the logician deigns to work, each 
such sentence expresses exactly one thought, each thought is expressed by exactly 
one such sentence, and the relation of consequence between such sentences 
expresses the relation of consequence between the thoughts they express.  Of course 
this is not true for all the sentences of one’s natural language -- the point is that it is 
true of all the sentences the logician is working with after extending and pruning them 
per the  prescriptions just described.   Frege eventually came to see such prescriptions  
as necessary.  
     We can call the items that result from this process propositions, once they meet 
such prescriptions; it is irrelevant whether or not the resulting items also happen to be 
sentences of a natural language.  In the Begriffsschrift, in explaining the value of the 
notation he introduced as a replacement for subject-predicate form, Frege said the 
symbolism he was presenting was a useful tool, if the task of philosophy was to 'break 
the power of words over the human mind' and to free thought  'from the taint of 
-  10  -                     copyright 2004 S. G. Sterrett    
ordinary linguistic means of expression.' (in Beany 1977; 51) 
     Some readers may take issue with the point just made above that for the pile of 
sentences with which the logician deigns to work, each thought is expressed by 
exactly one sentence, each sentence expresses exactly one thought, and the relation 
of consequence between sentences expresses the relation of consequence between 
the thoughts they express.  I am well aware that not everyone who has encountered 
Frege’s writings has the impression that Frege avoids the situation wherein a thought 
is expressed by more than one sentence.  Nevertheless this is what Frege says in 
'Thought”.  He wrote 'Thought' over 25 years after writing the much-emphasized and 
more widely studied 'On Sense and Reference' and almost 40 years4  after the 
publication of Begriffsschrift, the work in which he introduced the formalism suitable for 
doing arithmetic in a 'calculus of pure thought.'  In the Begriffsschrift (which predated a 
distinction he later drew between sense and reference), he did begin to lay out a view 
that was later revised.   As I see it, the vision and ideal he had are not rejected, but 
rather are better realized, in the view he later laid out in 'Thought.' In 'Thought' he 
explains more fully, and with examples, the process that  I have referred to as the 
extending and pruning of sentences in the natural language required to obtain the 
kind of propositions that are fitting for the study of logic.  
     There’s a similar progression in Frege’s work concerning his attitude towards the 
relation between sentences and the thoughts they express.  Frege’s break with the 
traditional subject-predicate form of his predecessors, which he discusses in the 
Begriffsschrift , is accompanied by the statement in that early work that this break with 
tradition is warranted, 'that logic hitherto has always followed ordinary language and 
grammar too closely.'(in Beany (1977); 51)   In the much later 'Thought”, Frege writes 
4
   The Begriffsschrift (Concept-Script) was published in 1879; Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations of 
Arithmetic)  in 1884, 'On Sense and Reference'in 1892, and  'Thought' in 1918.  'On the Foundations of 
Geometry'and associated correspondence with Hilbert and others was written around 1900.
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that, although he is not in the 'happy position' of the mineralogist who can exhibit the 
gem he is talking about,  he is resolved to a kind of resentful contentment:  'Something 
in itself not perceptible by sense, the thought, is presented to the reader --- and I must 
be content with that --- wrapped up in a perceptible linguistic form.' It is not, however, a 
totally peaceful contentment:  'The pictorial aspect of language presents difficulties.  
The sensible always breaks in and makes expressions pictorial and so improper.' 
(Frege 1918; 334)  The contentment he has achieved is the serenity of accepting what 
he cannot change.  
     Frege’s explanation of this point  --- that there are differences between the linguistic 
forms one needs in natural language (where sentences have additional functions not 
relevant to logic, such as the function of  generating expectations in a hearer that 
enable  conversations to be carried on effectively,  and the function of generating 
ideational associations),  and the logical forms one needs to establish the truths of 
arithmetic --- also illuminates his critique of Hilbert.  For, once one sees the view he 
expresses in 'Thought' about the relationship between sentences and the thoughts 
they express as the view he was in the process of working towards when he 
responded to Hilbert’s Foundations of Geometry , Frege’s response to Hilbert’s 
formalization of geometrical axioms seems quite natural.  
     Hilbert’s axioms of geometry were (what we would call) uninterpreted:  they were 
neither true nor false, until they received an interpretation.  Frege’s complaint was that 
the notion of an interpretation of a proposition was fundamentally incompatible with 
the notion of proposition required to do logic.   It’s easy to see why he thought so:  
logical relations hold between thoughts.  A proposition --- the kind of extended and 
pruned sentence logicians deal with --- expresses a thought, and only one thought.  
On this view, the notion of interpretation has no place in logic. 
     In his correspondence with Hilbert, Frege wrote  that  'one feels the broad, 
-  12  -                     copyright 2004 S. G. Sterrett    
imperspicuous and imprecise character of word language to be an obstacle, and to 
remedy this, one creates a sign language in which the investigation can be conducted 
in a more perspicuous way and with more precision.' He used a slightly different  
horticultural metaphor, the process of lignification, to illustrate a point about 
symbolism:  Instituting a new symbolism is like the tree’s new growth hardening --- 
after it has had a chance to take on the shape appropriate to performing its function.  
Then, additional new growth depends upon those hardened sections to support the 
delivery of nutrients to the newly forming branchtips.  The point is that trees do not 
grow into a predetermined suit of armour made of bark.  The rigidity provided by the 
bark comes only after new branch tips have had a chance to grow in a natural 
formation.  The sign language of a science is not set independently of inquiring as to 
what signs are best suited to it; if developed appropriately, these signs can be used to 
hook imperceptible thoughts and wrap them in a perceptible form so there is 
something that can be held in one’s hand, so to speak, and worked with.  Signs 
always involve a compromise compared to what one wishes to communicate, for, after 
all, signs are perceptible and the thoughts they express are not.  It is fundamental to 
Frege’s view that having the right formalism available is important to being able to 
capture the kinds of imperceptible thoughts in which one is interested.  Frege’s remark 
to Hilbert that the need for symbolism comes first, and only later the satisfaction of that 
need, reflects this conviction.  In correspondence, Hilbert expressed agreement with 
this last statement.  (Hilbert 4.10.1895 in Frege (1980); 34)
     Hilbert used axioms as implicit definitions of the concepts contained in them, 
though, and Frege didn’t like that anymore than he liked the fact that Hilbert’s axioms 
required interpretation in order to express a thought.  However, as critical as Frege 
might have seemed of Hilbert, he did evaluate Hilbert’s formalization of geometry with 
the idea of showing how one might achieve what Hilbert was after in a proper manner.  
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In fact, he outlined a way to make sense of Hilbert’s method of showing axioms 
independent of each other.  Frege’s reconstruction of Hilbert’s independence proofs, 
however, only work for (what Frege called) real propositions, which Hilbert’s axioms 
were not.  (Sterrett 1994)  
     Frege’s method works as follows:  one maps ('set(s) up a correspondence 
between’) words of a language (in which, of course, the reference of every word is fully 
determinate) onto other words of the same language, subject to some restrictions.  
These restrictions include mapping proper names to proper names, concept-words to 
concept-words of the same level, and so on.   The signs whose references belong to 
logic (e.g., negation, identity, subsumption, and subordination of concepts) are not 
mapped to different signs.  Then, one can show that a thought G is independent of a 
group of thoughts β, if one can obtain from  β and G, respectively, a map to a group of 
true thoughts  β’ and a false thought G’.   In Sterrett 1994 I argued that this was in fact 
somewhat like the approach Hilbert actually took, and so it was striking that Frege 
distinguishes his method from methods that employ interpretations of statements.  The 
significance of the difference between Hilbert and Frege, I concluded there, had to do 
with differences in their accounts of how words come to mean what they do.   I will not 
repeat that discussion here, as it is readily available elsewhere.5   
    
     It should be clear by now that Frege is not drawing a distinction between referring to 
a thought and referring to the perceptible linguistic form in which the thought is 
wrapped.  Frege’s point was that the only way he’s got to show anyone what thought 
5
   Giving a brief description of the contrast between Frege’s account of elucidation and Hilbert’s account of 
implicit definition risks mischaracterizing Hilbert as more formalist than he was, so I refer the reader to my 
discussion in Sterrett (1994).  In Sterrett (1994)  I distinguish the positions of Hilbert, Korselt (who 
responded to Frege on Hilbert’s behalf), and Frege.  The paper is available free online at the Philosophy 
of Science Archives server, at http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/
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he is referring to is by wrapping it in a perceptible linguistic form.  Hence in talking of 
the thought G’ to which G is mapped (via the mapping of words of a language as 
outlined above), Frege can hardly be talking about making substitutions of words in, 
and obtaining transformations of, anything other than sentences.  Not just any old 
sentences of a natural language, however.  These sentences or propositions are the 
result of extending and pruning sentences of the natural language so that  each 
proposition expresses one and only one thought, and so that propositions that express 
the same thought are not distinguished from each other.  I use the term 'proposition' 
here because Frege isn’t including all sentences of natural language.  He doesn’t talk 
about the forms he has to wrap thoughts in other than as the forms in which the 
thoughts are wrapped; these forms are not self-subsistent.  He was certainly against 
the idea of developing symbolic forms first and then looking for thoughts that might fit 
into them.  And I don’t think he ever meant to talk about these symbolic forms other 
than as used to express thoughts. 
     Thus, for Frege, the notion of logical consequence arises for relationships between 
the imperceptible thoughts that are wrapped up in perceptible forms, not to the forms of 
the wrappers themselves.  One cannot communicate thoughts except by capturing 
them in such a perceptible wrapping, so proofs and derivations proceed by way of 
rules that apply to propositions or statements.  However, these propositions always 
express a thought:  they are never empty wrappers.  They are not in need of 
interpretation. 
4. Departed Thoughts
Hence, Frege says that if by sentence is meant the 'external, audible, or visible that is 
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supposed to express a thought”, then it does not make any sense to say that one 
sentence is independent of another.  The context in which Frege wrote this was in 
arguing that Hilbert had erred in the specific way he had gone about trying to establish 
the independence of the parallel postulate from the other axioms of geometry.  It was 
in this context that Frege said that Hilbert makes a mistake in calling anything 'the 
axiom of parallels”, for, as Frege put it in the passage quoted above, it is not the same 
in every geometry:  'Only the wording is the same; the thought-content is different in 
each particular geometry.' 6  
     Frege means here to warn against mistaking the 'external, audible, or visible that is 
supposed to express a thought' for the thought .  Logic is concerned with thoughts and 
how they are related to each other.  So there is a realm of thought:  it cannot be 
perceived by the senses but it is like perceptible things in that it does not need an 
owner, as ideas do. (Frege 1918, 337)   Frege’s favorite example of a thought in his 
essay entitled 'Thought' is the Pythagorean theorem.  Different people can grasp the 
thought, and it can be communicated by wrapping it in a perceptible linguistic form.  
But I don’t think Frege intends to alert the reader to the existence of a logical calculus 
of the 'the external, audible, or visible  that is supposed to express a thought.' This 
would be a study of the relationships of linguistic forms, something Frege thought of 
interest for many purposes -- understanding conversations and writing poetry, for 
instance --- but decidedly not the subject matter of logic.  Logic is about thoughts, it is 
about the laws of thought,  the laws of the laws of science.  It is about deriving proofs 
so that we can see how one thought depends upon another.   It involves the linguistic 
forms in which these thoughts must be wrapped in order to be communicated, but only 
6
   Frege’s analysis is that the fault lies in confounding first- and second- level concepts, such as the 
concept of point.  There may be different first-level concepts of point, under which points fall:  the 
Euclidean point-concept is one such first-level concept.   If one likes, one may also define a second-level 
concept, within which the Euclidean point-concept and other first-level concepts, fall.  A fuller discussion 
of Frege’s point  is given in Sterrett 1994, page 9. 
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in the context of investigating which thoughts depend upon which other thoughts.  It is 
not about relationships of dependence between perceptible linguistic forms.  If there 
are such things as forms that exist as shed snakeskins left behind from departed 
thoughts, they are not the concern of logic;  they are not the items of a calculus of pure 
thought.  
     For Frege, there is no such thing as a realm of linguistic forms within which no 
thoughts are wrapped but which are related to each other in virtue of their form by 
logical laws.  The logical relations are not logical relations between linguistic forms.  
5.  The unity of thought and expression
Frege did discuss examples of different sentences that expressed the same thought, 
even in 'Thought”, arguing that 'the content of a sentence often goes beyond the 
thought expressed in it.' But, his response to this observation was not to posit a new 
kind of logical law or a new kind of logical relation to account for how such sentences 
were related.  In 'Thought”, he did not regard such situations as puzzles; he did not 
then consider them relevant to logic.  Rather, his response to this observation about 
natural language was that the logician does not distinguish between such sentences.  
     Was Frege this blasé about different sentences that express the same thought 
because, on a view sometimes attributed to Frege, he thought that there are really two 
distinct things, sentences and thoughts, and thus that the distinction between 
sentences is a distinction that can be made only in the realm of what is derivable, and 
not in the realm of what is provable?  I don’t think that this is how Frege’s views on 
sentences that express the same thought ought to be viewed.  
     Recall that what Frege said about pairs of distinct sentences that express the same 
thought was only that some such transformations between sentences must be 
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recognized as admissible.  But this wasn’t a matter of recognizing relationships that 
obtain in a realm of  equipollent propositions.  In his 1906 letter to Husserl, in fact, 
Frege suggested that equipollent propositions could all be communicated by a single 
standard proposition. (in Beany 1997, 302)  In closing the letter, he remarks that the 
question of whether equipollent propositions are congruent  'could well be debated for 
a hundred years or more.' But he isn’t concerned about the answer; he writes 'I do not 
see what criterion would allow us to decide this question objectively. . .  But I do find 
that if there is no objective criterion for answering a question, then the question has no 
place at all in science.' (in Beany 1997; 305)  Placing significance on the difference in 
the relations that hold between sentences and the relations that hold between 
thoughts is attributing significance to exactly what, I think, he actually said ought to be 
de-emphasized.   
     We have seen that what Frege said about sentence transformations that do not 
affect the thought expressed was that sentences with differences that don’t affect the 
thought expressed don’t need to be distinguished when doing logic.  All that the 
existence of transformations that yield two or more sentences expressing the same 
thought means to the logician is that, if propositions or statements admit of such 
transformations, one must recognize as admissible those transformations that do not 
affect the thought expressed.  Once we see this point of Frege’s, the apparition of the 
notion of derivability according to which things are not always as they seem 
disappears:  i.e., the notion of derivability on which a thought when wrapped in a 
different wrapper might have different derivability relations disappears.  There is a 
realm of  thoughts (thoughts are not the property of  individuals as ideas are, but they 
are not perceptible either), and it is distinct from the realm of perceptible things. (Frege 
1918; 337)  Logical laws are used in showing the relationships that exist between 
thoughts, via a proof.  Thus,  the realm in which logical rules apply involves both of 
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these realms, since it includes both thoughts and signs; and this in turn is due to the 
unavoidable situation that communication of thoughts requires that thoughts be 
wrapped in perceptible forms. 
     What about Frege’s statement that a thought can be 'carved up' in different ways?  
Doesn’t the fact that the same thought could be carved up in different ways mean that 
the same thought could be expressed by different sentences?  Yes and No --  the 
difference being a matter of which language you are talking about.  In natural 
language:  Yes, the same thought can be expressed by different sentences that 
analyze the thought into subject and predicate differently; typically this will happen 
whenever the same sentence is transformed from the active to the passive voice.  But 
in the formal language of the Begriffsschrift, the answer is No:  the carving really 
captures the structure of the thought relevant to the kind of inferences one wants to be 
able to draw.   That is, the whole point of the Begriffsschrift was that subject-predicate 
logic did not get at the structure of thought relevant to making inferences!  In contrast, 
the formalism of the Begriffsschrift was created to ensure that all of the structure 
relevant to making inferences that were a matter of pure logic could be expressed. 
The point that the situation of having only subject-predicate logic available is restrictive 
in spite of allowing many options might be explained using the metaphor of a plant,  as 
follows:  that situation is like having only a certain kind of analysis of the plant 
available to you, for instance, having only the option of describing a plant in terms of 
dividing it up into the edible food it bears and the part of the plant that produces the 
edible food.  What’s limiting about this is not a matter of how many ways there are to 
carve up the plant, for in fact the edible-food and  plant-that-produces-food way of 
carving up a plant permits many different ways of carving up the plant.  Depending 
upon what part of the plant a creature is interested in consuming, one could analyze 
the plant into an edible product and the remainder of the plant that produces it in 
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different ways, just as the subject-predicate form allows one to express a thought in 
different ways depending upon what one chooses as the subject of the sentence.  
Rather (using the plant metaphor)  the limitation is this:  the available ways of 
analyzing the plant does not necessarily allow us to analyze the plant structure in the 
way required for investigations in natural science.  Analyses of a plant based on edible 
parts of the plant does exhibit something about the structure of the plant, of course, but 
it also obscures some of the structure of the plant.  What we want is a general method 
of carving up the plant in a way that allows the flexibility and precision to exhibit 
various kinds of structure in the plant, a way that permits the many different kinds of 
carving ups of the plant needed for making inferences we want to draw to conduct 
research about a variety of questions that interest us.   
     On this analogy, what’s wrong with subject-predicate logic is that the kinds of  
'carving up' of a thought it permits -- and it may permit a number of alternatives -- might 
not include the structure of the thought that is relevant to making the kinds of 
inferences in which one is interested.   In contrast, the formalism of the Begriffsschrift , 
in which concepts are modelled on functions, is meant to introduce a formal language 
in which one can carve a thought in any way needed for making scientific inferences. 
The formalism provided in that work is supposed to be enough to permit making any 
inferences that are a matter of pure logic.  This is not to say that the kind of structure 
sought for even when using the formalism of the Begriffsschrift may not be relative to 
the  kinds of inferences one is interested in making (hence the formalism needed for 
chemistry and physics is left open in the Begriffsschrift;  in my biological metaphor, the 
added formalism needed to carve the plant into its relevant parts might be the gene 
concept).  It is to say that the formal language does not, as subject-predicate logic 
does, limit one to carving  the plant into two parts according to a criterion that may 
never permit one to delineate the structure of the plant relevant to the inference in 
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which one is interested.  
     The advance Frege offered was not was a way of dissecting of a thought into 
formalism and unformed thought, but, rather, consisted in a formalism that permitted 
carving thoughts in more useful ways than previous formalisms allowed.  The 
separation of thought from sentence underlying the distinction between provability and 
derivability is not something we find in Frege.  To describe such a disconnect as part of 
Frege’s view misdescribes Frege’s notion of a proposition in the same way that  
Aristotle’s notion of form would be misdescribed by using Plato’s notion of form.  That 
is, in Plato’s philosophy, forms exist in a realm separate from the things of which they 
are forms.  Aristotle, too, used a metaphor from biology to break from Plato:  that there 
are male and female animals, he said,  does not imply that  male and female exists as 
something separable from male and female animals.  
     To use another metaphor:  in a certain science fiction television series, there is a 
creature that can transform itself into various shapes, called a shape-shifter.  These 
shape-shifters can separate from their shapes and meld together somehow in a realm 
in which they are shapeless.  But this is, after all, fiction.  To make the metaphor of 
shape-shifters who take on various shapes fit Frege’s account of sentences as the 
forms within which thoughts are wrapped, let us leave the details of this particular 
science fiction story behind and stipulate that shape-shifters take on human forms, that 
a given shape-shifter cannot take on every form and, in fact, that the forms a particular 
shape-shifter takes on are not taken on by any other creature.  (This corresponds to 
Frege’s requirements that, in his formalism,  thoughts are expressed by sentences, that 
more than one thought is expressible, and that no sentence expresses more than one 
thought.)  Clearly, once we’ve figured out the shapes between which a particular 
shape-shifter can transform itself, we no longer need distinguish between those 
shapes. 
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     The analogy to thoughts and the linguistic forms they take on is this:  just as, in the 
science fiction story,  a creature is apprehended via the senses by its sensible form, so 
a thought is expressed via a sentence.  That, in effect, is Frege’s unperturbed 
response in his essay 'Thought' to the examples in which there are several sentences 
that express the same thought, such as two sentences that differ only in the manner 
used to designate an object.   That is, in contrast to the view that Frege is saying that 
there are two different calculi, one for thoughts and one for the linguistic forms in which 
they can be wrapped, Frege shows that he intends to avoid such commitments by  
stipulating that, when proper names are used, only one manner of presentation (e.g., 
for Venus, either 'the morning star' or 'the evening star”, but not both)  be permitted.  
Thus I do not think that, as is often supposed, that Frege developed a calculus of 
sentences associated with something called derivability in addition to the calculus of 
thoughts associated with provability.    His remark to Husserl (quoted earlier) that he 
does not think there is room in science for the question of whether equipollent 
propositions are congruent bears this out. 
     Looking back from the present, some people attribute to Frege’s  Begriffsschrifft  the 
achievement of having developed a calculus of sentences related by derivability, 
which are accurately described in modern parlance as syntactic relations.   This is not 
so, and Frege is explicit enough about what he was doing to make that clear.  Frege’s 
Begriffsschrift was to be a calculus of thoughts.  There were reasons that the calculus 
had to involve symbolic formalism -- to clarify thoughts, and to express them -- but the 
calculus was not a 'topic-neutral' calculus of symbolic or syntactic forms.  That may be 
what a modern logician sees in looking at the Begriffsschrift, but it doesn’t sound much 
like Frege’s description of the Begriffsschrift.   What it does sound like, however, is 
Frege’s description of  Leibniz’s vision, which, he said,  'was too grandiose for the 
attempt to realize it to go further than the bare preliminaries.'(in Beany, p. 50)  Frege 
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thought Leibniz’s vision of a universal calculus an excellent guiding vision, but what 
he said about his own achievement in the Begriffsschrift with respect to Leibniz’s 
visionary aim was that 'even if this great aim cannot be achieved at the first attempt, 
one need not despair of a slow, step by step approach.' The project, Frege said,  'has 
to be limited provisionally' at first.  And he identified the Begriffsschrift as one of the 
'realizations of the Leibnizian conception in particular fields.' (50)   He spoke of 
additions that would have to be made to extend it to geometry and then to the pure 
theory of motion, then mechanics, and then physics.  These latter fields involve natural 
necessity as well as conceptual necessity.  
     In his correspondence with Hilbert, Frege writes that he thinks Hilbert is (mistakenly) 
treating geometry as if it were like arithmetic.  Frege thought it an error to regard 
geometrical knowledge as having the same kind of basis as arithmetical knowledge.  
This is important, for it meant that Frege didn’t think sentences or propositions of 
geometry were related to each other in the same way that statements of arithmetic 
were.  The Begriffsschrift was to help in showing that arithmetical truths were truths of 
logic, but even this does not mean that the rules in the Begriffsschrift applied to topic-
neutral sentences, for Frege did not take a formalist approach to arithmetic either.  
What I mean by this is that he did not allow (what we would now call) uninterpreted 
statements of arithmetic anymore than he did statements of geometry.   In the Basic 
Laws of Arithmetic, he reiterates his requirement on axioms, i.e., that all the terms in 
them must be defined.  That he is not always able to meet the requirement should not 
be cited as evidence that some of the concepts are implicitly defined or are 
uninterpreted and to be interpreted at a later date.  Rather, Frege’s explanation of such 
undefined concepts is found in a statement he makes in preliminary remarks in the 
Basic Laws:  'It will not always be possible to give a regular definition of everything, 
precisely because our endeavor must be to trace our way back to what is logically 
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simple, which as such is not properly definable.  I must then be satisfied with indicating 
what I intend by means of hints.' ( Frege 1964; 32)   The principles of the Begriffsschrift 
may apply to every science, but according to Frege they do not include all the 
principles nor, even, all the formalism needed to do geometry, kinematics, physics, or 
chemistry.   These await future development, he said.   
     Thus, we must avoid the anachronism of splitting asunder a propositional form from 
a thought.   For Frege, a proposition is a thought wrapped in a perceptible linguistic 
form, i.e., a propositional form.  The perceptible linguistic form it is possible to wrap a 
thought in may not be uniquely determined for a given thought, but  the thought must 
be wrapped in some perceptible linguistic form or other.  Hence the proposition cannot 
survive such a dissection.  Even in developing a calculus in which the ideal is 'one 
proposition, one thought; one thought, one proposition”,  a thought and its expression 
are not split apart.  Throughout his correspondence with Hilbert, Frege seems 
concerned to speak of the proposition as a whole, i.e., a 'real' proposition expressing a 
thought.  The kind of axioms Hilbert proposed, which were neither true nor false, and 
so which, on Frege’s view,  did not express thoughts, were not  , on his view, proper 
subjects of logic.  
     On Frege’s view, a  thought is necessarily wrapped in linguistic form if it is to be 
communicated, studied, or used in reasoning.  Thoughts are individuals for Frege, 
somewhat as trees and humans were individuals for Aristotle.  Aristotle was concerned 
(at least in some of his works ) to hold out for the identity of an individual in spite of the 
different things that could be predicated of it, but in a way that didn’t call for dissecting 
that individual into a self-subsistent form and something else.  Similarly, what Frege 
thought was called for with respect to thoughts was a method of expressing an 
individual thought that exhibited the structure of the thought in such a way that we 
could see its relation to other thoughts, but in a way that didn’t call for dissecting it into 
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a self-subsistent linguistic part and something else.  Frege also seemed to recognize 
different kinds of relations between thoughts, that the relations that were crucial might 
be different for different investigations and different disciplines.  The Begriffsschrift was 
meant to provide a calculus in which to express thoughts that met the needs of the 
discipline of logic, i.e., a calculus in which the logical relations between thoughts 
would be exhibited.  Frege continually warned against the tendencies of some of his 
contemporaries to take the approach of attempting to separate the propositional form 
of a proposition from the thought it expresses and treat it as self-subsistent.  The 
admonition to refrain from attempting such fatal dissections, though, is quite general.  It 
is as old as Aristotle and as new as post-analytic philosophy. 
Department of Philosophy
Duke University, Durham, NC 27712
submitted to Mind and Language on June 24th, 2004
Word count:  8346 
-  25  -                     copyright 2004 S. G. Sterrett    
REFERENCES
Antonelli, Aldo and Robert May ( 2000)  Frege’s new science.   Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic,  41, 
No. 3. 
Beany, Michael, ed.   (1997)  The Frege Reader.   Oxford:  Blackwell Publishers.
Blanchette, Patricia. 1996:  Frege and Hilbert on consistency.  Journal of Philosophy 93, 317-336     
Frege (1900a)  Frege to Hilbert 6.1.1900.   In Frege (1980), pgs. 43-48.
Frege, Gottlob 1918:  Thought.   In Beany (1997), pgs. 325-345.
Frege, Gottlob.  1964:   The Basic Laws of Arithmetic. Exposition of the System. Translated and edited, 
with an introduction, by Montgomery Furth.  Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Frege, Gottlob. 1980:   Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence.  Edited by Brian McGuinness 
and Translated by Hans Kaal.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Resnik, Michael. 1994: The Frege-Hilbert controversy', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 34, 
386 - 403. 
Ricketts, Thomas 1997:  Frege’s 1906 foray into metalogic.   Philosophical Topics, 25, 169-188. 
Sterrett, S. G.  1994:  Frege and Hilbert on the foundations of geometry.   Available on the Philosophy of 
Science e-print archives ( http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/  ) 
Tappenden, Jamie.  2001:  Frege on axioms, indirect proof, and independence arguments in geometry:  
Did Frege reject independence arguments?  Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic , 41: 271- 315.
-  26  -                     copyright 2004 S. G. Sterrett    
